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In addition to passing on the question of prescription un-
necessarily, the decision appears to be in conflict with the well-
established principles underlying Louisiana mineral law. It is
illogical to say that the very same right to explore for and pro-
duce minerals may be leased for more than ten years, without
exercise, but may not be sold for more than ten years, without
exercise. 42 Unless mineral leases are made subject to liberative
prescription, control of the minerals will be separated from the
ownership of the surface beyond ten years without user. This
result would be tantamount to establishing a system of separate
ownership of minerals and would be an obvious departure from
the established public policy of the non-ownership theory.
43
Earl E. Veron
PRICE DISCRIMINATION - GOOD FAITH MEETING OF COMPETITION
Standard Oil Company was selling gasoline to four large pur-
chasers in the Detroit area at a lower price than it was selling to
other purchasers in the same area. Because of this difference in
price the Federal Trade Commission, under authority of the
Robinson-Patman Amendment to the Clayton Act, instituted
price discrimination proceedings against Standard. In spite of
defendant's offer to show that the price reductions were made in
good faith to meet competition, the Commission issued a cease
and desist order based solely upon proof of injury to competi-
tion.' The court of appeals affirmed.2 The Supreme Court, hold-
ing that a good faith meeting of competition was an absolute
defense, reversed and remanded for a finding on this issue.3 The
Commission then found the price reductions not to have been
made in good faith, but pursuant to a price system4 utilized to
meet unlawful competition. 5 The circuit court, on examination
42. DAGGETT, LOUiSIANA MINERAL RIGHTS 16 (rev. ed. 1949).
43. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207
(1922).
1. Matter of Standard Oil Co., 41 F.T.C. 263 (1945), modified by 43 F.T.C.
56 (1946).
2. Standard Oil Co. v. F.T.C., 173 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949).
3. 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
4. A price system is a sales setup designed to give, regularly, one purchaser or
group of purchasers the advantage of a lower price than that charged other pur-
chasers. Price systems have been held to be per se violations of the Robinson-
Patman Act. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 725 (1948) ; FTC v. Staley
Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945). See AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED
PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON°PATMAN ACT 96 (1950).
5. Matter of Standard Oil Co., 49 F.T.C. 923 (1953).
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of the entire record, reversed the findings of the Commission. 6
Granting certiorari, the Supreme Court held affirmed, with four
Justices dissenting. The court of appeals made a fair assessment
of the record when it found that there was no basis for a find-
ing that the oil company's reductions were pursuant to a price
system; and in the absence of such evidence the Commission's
suit falls. Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Oil Co., 78 Sup.
Ct. 369 (1958).
Antitrust legislation has as its purpose the preservation of
competitive enterprise. The Sherman Act of 18907 was the first
of the principal antitrust laws; it condemned monopolies and
combinations in restraint of trade. The language used in the
statute, however, was too vague to encompass many practices
which undoubtedly restrain trade.8 Two important remedial acts
followed in 1914. The Federal Trade Commission Act 9 con-
demned all "unfair methods of competition" and set up the
Federal Trade Commission as a continuous agency of inquiry
and warning on the legitimacy of competitive methods. The
Clayton Act 0 supplemented the Sherman Act by making illegal
certain steps in the growth of monopoly and restraint of trade;
it was designed to check such practices before they gained too
firm a foothold.
Price discrimination is one of the most effective methods of
restraining trade and, accordingly, a section of the Clayton Act
was devoted to the subject. But virtually no use was made of
this section." The early emphasis of antitrust was in the field
of production; litigation was thus centered around other sec-
tions of the act. By the time injurious discriminatory buying
and selling tactics by chain stores and other mass distributors
became prevalent the price discrimination section of the Clayton
Act had become almost a dead letter.' 2 The Federal Trade Coin-
6. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 233 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1956).
7. Act of July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 STAT. 209, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, 15 (1937).
8. See ZORN & FELDMAN, BUSINESS UNDER TuE NEw PRICE LAWS 42 (1937).
9. Act of September 26, 1914, c. 311, 38 STAT. 717, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1938).
10. Act of October 15, 1914, c. 323, 28 STAT. 730, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1937).
11. During the period of extensive growth of the chain stores the courts held
that discrimination which injured only competitors of the buyer and not of the
seller was not subject to the act. Mennen v. FTC, 288 Fed. 774 (2d Cir. 1923),
cert. denied, 262 U.S. 759 (1923); National Biscuit Co. v. FTC, 229 Fed. 733
(2d Cir. 1924). But aee George Van Camp and Sons Co. v. American Can Co.,
278 U.S. 245 (1929).
12. Proviso allowing quantity discounts was regarded as so weakening Section 2
of the Clayton Act as to "render it inadequate if not a nullity." House Committee
Report on Robinson-Patman Act, H. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936).
See also FTC Final Report on the Chain Store Investigation, Sen. Doc. No. 4,
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mission, however, did conduct an extensive investigation of
chain-store practices and this investigation led to a senate resolu-
tion which ultimately culminated in the passage of the Robinson-
Patman Act in 1936.18
The Robinson-Patman Act in amending the Clayton Act was
designed particularly to give life to the price discrimination sec-
tion of that act.' 4 The amendment greatly facilitated enforce-
ment of this provision. It effects its purpose by providing that a
prima facie case is made against a defendant by proof of a
relatively uncomplicated set of facts: that the defendant did in
fact sell, in interstate commerce, commodities of like grade and
quality at different prices and that this discrimination substan-
tially injured competition. 5 The existence vel non of the neces-
sary facts to meet these criteria is easily determined. Once these
facts are shown the burden shifts to the defendant to bring for-
ward proof with which to rebut the initial findings or to bring
himself within an affirmative defense.' 6 This shifting of the bur-
den has greatly augmented the effectiveness of the act in that it
tends to eliminate the very real problem of non-availability of
internal, confidential records and statistics of a defendant.
With the act set up as it is, the applicability of the affirma-
tive defenses is the key issue in many, if not most, price dis-
crimination cases. Subsection 2(a) of the act provides that a
defendant may make an affirmative defense by showing that the
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 90-91 (1934). But see American Can Co. v. Lodaga Canning
Co., 44 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1930).
13. See FTC Final Report on the Chain Store Investigation, Sen. Doc. No. 4,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1934). The Robinson-Patman Bill became the Act of
June 19, 1936, 49 STAT. 1526, 15 U.S.C. § 13-13(c) (1937). For a concise synopsis
of the background of the Robinson-Patman Act, see OPPENHEIM, PRICE AND
SERvIcE DISCRIMINATIONS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAw ACT 7-11 (1949).
14. The Robinson-Patman Act also prohibits commissions, brokerages, allow-
ances, or discounts, except for services rendered, in connection with sales (§ 2(c)).
Also, according to this act, terms of contracts of sale must be on a proportionately
equal basis (§ 2(d), (e)). Section 2(f) prohibits inducing or receiving discrimina-
tions in price prohibited by the act. Section 3 makes it unlawful to be a party to
or assist in any discriminations, rebates, discounts, and granting of merchandising
services made unlawful by the other sections of this act.
15. The exact extent which competition must be injured is as yet undeter-
mined. But injury to competition will not be inferred from a mere showing of
difference in price. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786
(7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 206 (1952). See FTC v. Morton Salt Co.,
334 U.S. 37 (1948) ; FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948). See also
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS 160-66 (March 31, 1955).
16. "Upon proof being made . . . that there has been discrimination in
price . . . ., the burden of rebutting the prima facie case thus made by showing
justification shall be upon the person charged with a violation of this section, and
unless justification shall be affirmatively shown, the Commission is authorized to
issue an order terminating the discrimination." 15 U.S.C. § 13 (b) (1937).
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difference in prices was due to (1) different supply or delivery
costs, 17 or (2) changing conditions affecting the market, 8 for
example, as found in dealings with perishable or seasonal goods.
A third defense, provided in Subsection 2(b), allows a seller to
rebut the prima facie case by showing that he lowered his price
in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor. 9 It
had originally been thought that a prima facie case could be made
without a showing of injury to competition, and that the good
faith meeting of competition requirement of Subsection 2(b)
was merely a procedural provision which, when exercised, would
shift to the plaintiff the burden of going forward with the evi-
dence showing that the discrimination did in fact injure a sub-
stantial amount of competition.2 0  That theory was exploded,
however, when the instant case was before the Supreme Court
in 1951.21 There the court found that good faith meeting of
competition was an absolute defense to price discrimination.
Thus this defense can now become the focal point in a discrimi-
nation case instead of being a mere responsive tactical maneuver.
To bring oneself within the other defenses allowed in the act
is ordinarily a difficult undertaking. Proof of cost justifica-
tion, if existent, is often hard to accumulate and very expensive
in large enterprises.2 The defense as to changing conditions of
17. The cost defense has proved largely illusory in practice. After one success-
ful cost defense before the Commission in 1937, Bird & Son, 25 FTC 58 (1937),
it was not until seventeen years later that an accused seller in a fully contested
proceeding succeeded in a complete cost defense. B. F. Goodrich Co., FTC Docket
5677 (1954) and Sylvania Elec. Products Co., FTC Docket 5728 (1954). See
Standard Brands Inc., 29 FTC 121 (1939) ; E. B. Muller & Co., 33 FTC 24
(1941) ; Morton Salt Co., 39 FTC 35 (1944).
18. This proviso exempts "price changes from time to time where in response
to changing conditions affecting the market for or the marketability of the goods
concerned, such as, but not limited to actual or imminent deterioration of perish-
able goods, obsolescence of seasonal goods, distress sales under court process, or
sales in good faith in discontinuance of business in the goods concerned." (§ 2(b)).
See Huber v. Pillsbury Flour Mills Co., 30 F. Supp. 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) ; Moore
v. Meade Service Co., 190 F.2d 540 (10th Cir. 1951).
19. Other than the instant case, leading cases interpreting this provision are:
FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948) ; FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co.,
324 U.S. 746 (1945); Samuel H. Mons, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.
1945) ; American Can Co. v. Lodaga Canning Co., 44 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1930).
20. "Congress adopted the common device in such cases of shifting the burden
of proof to anyone who sets two prices, and who probably knows why he had done
so, and what has been the result. If he can prove that the lower price did not
prevent anyone from taking away the business he will succeed." Samuel H. Moss,
Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1946).
See FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945) ; Standard Oil Co. v. FTC,
173 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949). See also OPPENHEIm, PRICE ANn SzRviCE DiS-
CRIMINATION UNDER THE RornNS0i-PATMAN ACT 35-37 (1949).
21. 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
22. The Supreme Court acknowledged "the intricacies inherent in the attempt
to show costs in a Robinson-Patman Act proceeding" and observed the "elusive-
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marketability applies only to the narrow field of perishable sea-
sonal commodities where the highly fluctuating supply results in
unstable prices. Now that good faith meeting of competition is
an absolute defense, decisions determining the scope of this de-
fense will greatly influence the continued practicality and work-
ability of the Robinson-Patman Act.
The full extent and boundaries of the term "good faith" as
used in the Robinson-Patman Act are as yet undetermined, but
certain activities are known to preclude good faith. A reduction
in price must be no more than necessary to meet competition,
that is, for a reduction to be made in good faith the price must
not be set lower than the competitor's. 23 The competitor's price
which a defendant meets must be a lawful price; an unlawful
price could not make another price lawful. 24 Also negating good
faith is a price system which constantly results in the seller re-
ceiving a higher price for like goods from some customers than
from others.25 Similarly, where a seller adopts his competitors'
higher prices as well as their lower prices and makes no effort to
undersell them in markets where he has a competitive advantage,
his lower prices will not be allowed as a good faith meeting of
competition. 26 Thus, since it is known that certain pricing activi-
ties per se preclude good faith, it would seem to follow that a
seller who regularly grants a quantity discount could not justify
the discount merely by showing that the purchaser could have
obtained the same discount on purchases in like quantities from
other suppliers.
In the instant case defendant designated four of its 362
Detroit customers as "jobbers" and sold gasoline to them at 1
cents per gallon less than the price charged other customers. The
distinguishing characteristics of these four "jobbers" were:
They could store gasoline in "tank car" quantities; they had
ness of cost data" which that effort entailed. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346
U.S. 61, 68, 79 (1953). See note 16 supra.
23. Seller must merely meet, not undercut, price of a competitor. Samuel H.
Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945).
See Porto Rican Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1929).
24. A defendant would only be held to a businessman's reasonable knowledge
of his rival's pricing data in a competitive economy. Automatic Canteen Co. v.
FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953) ; FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945).
He nded not prove the competitor's price was actually lawful. Standard Oil Co. v.
Brown, 238 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1956).
25. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948) ; FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg.
Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945). See also note 4 supra.
26. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945). See AusTIN, PaIcE DiS-
CRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AoT 96
(1950).
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facilities to deliver gasoline to other retailers; they had estab-
lished businesses sufficient to insure purchases of from one to
two million gallons a year; and they had adequate credit re-
sponsibility. The term "jobber," as used here, was purely arbi-
trary since many of defendant's other Detroit customers resold
gasoline to retailers.2T Since defendant did not prove cost justi-
fication the court expressly proceeded on the assumption that
the difference in price was not entirely justified by the differ-
ence in cost of delivery.28 Thus, as perishable goods were not
involved here, the only defense available to defendant was that
of good faith meeting of competition.
The decision that defendant had brought himself within this
defense is illuminating in that it embraces findings which af-
firmatively fulfill the requisites for "good faith meeting of com-
petition." Findings sufficient in the instant case were: (1) The
recipients of the lower price had achieved a volume of distribu-
tion within the range recognized as entitling them to a reduced
price under the commonly accepted standards of the industry.
(2) Defendant was "pressured" 29 by the buyer to meet more
attractive price offers made by other suppliers; in fact, three
of defendant's other large customers had been "pirated" away by
the competition. (3) There was lengthy haggling, including an
"ultimatum," as to the amount of the proposed reduction in
price. (4) No basis was found in the record for a finding that
Standard's reduced prices were made pursuant to a price sys-
tem. 0 That these findings were considered sufficient for the
defense to obtain is a step toward a more complete knowledge
of the meaning of the term "good faith," as used in that defense.
Although the extreme minimum requirements for coming within
this defense are not known, the findings in the instant case
present a set of facts which may be analogized or set as a goal by
future defendants.
The instant decision shows that certainly the task of coming
within the good faith meeting of competition defense is not an
insurmountable one. Reduction in price solely because of a
volume of sales (without a corresponding proven cost saving)
27. The court acknowledged that this term was not an accurate description of
an economic function but was merely used to placate customers who were not re-
ceiving the lower prices. See FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 78 Sup. Ct. 369, 371, n. 2
(1958).
28. 340 U.S. 231, 234 (1951).
29. "Pressured" is the term used by the court. 78 Sup. Ct. 369, 373 (1958).
30. See the express statement to this effect. Id. at 370.
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is not in itself an adequate justification, but rather has been
condemned in price discrimination disputes.81 Offers by com-
petitors, haggling, and ultimatums appear as weighty facts, but
upon reflection it is realized that facts such as these can be easily
shammed or can become formalities quickly fulfilled by parties
desiring to avoid the law. The loss of customers is, of course, a
more objective criterion. But regardless of the quality or quan-
tity of the findings here shown to be sufficient for the defense,
this decision is primarily noteworthy because of its negative
aspects: the court did not make the defendant affirmatively
prove that its pricing activities were free from certain elements
that are known to preclude good faith.
The mere fact that a competitor offered a lower price does
not necessarily mean that a defendant can lawfully meet it; one
unlawful price should not justify another . 2 Prior to the instant
decision it had been believed that before a defendant could come
within the good faith meeting of competition exception he would
have to show affirmatively that he had a reasonable belief that
the price he met was itself lawful.3 3 Here the court made no
mention of such a showing, or the lack thereof, thus implying
that the burden of proving such elements rested on the Commis-
sion. Similarly, in the last of the findings, that there was no
showing of a basis for a finding that defendant's reduced prices
were made pursuant to a pricing system, the court apparently
put the burden of proving the existence of a price system on the
Commission. But the Commission at the initial hearing, ap-
parently believing it unnecessary,3 4 did not show that the four
(of 362) Detroit customers had been given the same reduced
rate according to a pricing system. Apparently, the court's re-
fusal to place the burden on the defendant to show the lawful-
ness of the met price as well as to show that it was not employ-
ing an unlawful pricing system presents a procedural scheme
heretofore unknown in price discrimination cases. By these re-
31. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948) ; FTC v. Cement Institute,
333 U.S. 683 (1948).
32. See note 24 supra.
33. "The burden is upon defendant to prove the price of its competing refiner
if defendant seeks to rely on this defense. . . . [T]he price of the competitor might
not be a lawful price." Enterprise Industries v. Texas Co., 136 F. Supp. 420 (D.
Conn. 1955). That competitors are engaged in similar violations of this section is
no defense or justification. Butterick Co. v. FTC, 4 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1925),
cert. denied, 267 U.S. 602 (1925). See note 24 suPra.
34. The court of appeals remarked that they suspected the contention of the
FTC that defendant was employing a price system was merely an afterthought, and
the Commission itself asserted that it was. 233 F.2d 649, 653 (7th Cir. 1956).
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fusals of the court, this area of the Robinson-Patman Act is seen
to be at least partially without the effective device, the shifting
of the burden of proof, that gives effect to other areas of the
act. The Commission now, in this limited area must resume,
after over two decades of rest, the unwieldy burden of gaining
"secret" information and searching for inaccessible records with
which to prosecute a defendant.
But it should be said that the area in which the burden is to
be resumed is indeed limited. It is only after the defendant
has come forward and shown affirmative elements of good faith,
as exemplified by the findings in the instant case, that the plain-
tiff need take a turn. It would be up to him then to show ele-
ments negating good faith. This is certainly a very sensible situ-
ation; otherwise, as more and more activities which per se pre-
clude good faith become known in the jurisprudence, a defendant
would be required to show affirmatively the absence of dozens,
perhaps hundreds, of activities. Such a burden would surely
be unreasonable.
The decision in the instant case, then, gives more than merely
an example of affirmative facts sufficient to come within a de-
fense; it unfolds an equitable see-saw procedure for presentation
of proof under the Robinson-Patman Act.
Philip E. Henderson
TORTS - CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR CONTRACTORS - LIABILITY
TO THIRD PERSONS AFTER ACCEPTANCE OF WORK BY OWNER
Two recent cases reflect rapid changes in the tort liability of
construction and repair contractors to third persons. In Marine
Ins. Co. v. Strecker,' the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a
contractor could be liable for damages to a tenant's glassware
caused by negligence in the installation of a cabinet under a con-
tract with the building owner, even though the damage occurred
several months after the acceptance of the work by the building
owner. The California Supreme Court went even further in Dow
v. Holly Manufacturing Co.2 The court held that a general con-
tractor was liable to a third person for the negligence of his sub-
contractor, who had improperly installed a heater during the
1. 234 La. 522, 100 So.2d 493 (1957).
2. 49 Cal.2d 720, 321 P.2d 736 (1958).
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